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Abstract—This paper investigates the piracy problem
of deep learning models. Designing and training a well-
performing model is generally expensive. However, when
releasing them, attackers may reverse engineer the models
and pirate their design. This paper, therefore, proposes
deep learning obfuscation, aiming at obstructing attackers
from pirating a deep learning model. In particular, we fo-
cus on obfuscating convolutional neural networks (CNN),
a widely employed type of deep learning architectures
for image recognition. Our approach obfuscates a CNN
model eventually by simulating its feature extractor with
a shallow and sequential convolutional block. To this end,
we employ a recursive simulation method and a joint
training method to train the simulation network. The
joint training method leverages both the intermediate
knowledge generated by a feature extractor and data
labels to train a simulation network. In this way, we can
obtain an obfuscated model without accuracy loss. We
have verified the feasibility of our approach with three
prevalent CNNs, i.e., GoogLeNet, ResNet, and DenseNet.
Although these networks are very deep with tens or
hundreds of layers, we can simulate them in a shallow
network including only five or seven convolutional layers.
The obfuscated models are even more efficient than the
original models. Our obfuscation approach is very effective
to protect the critical structure of a deep learning model
from being exposed to attackers. Moreover, it can also
thwart attackers from pirating the model with transfer
learning or incremental learning techniques because the
shallow simulation network bears poor learning ability. To
our best knowledge, this paper serves as a first attempt
to obfuscate deep learning models, which may shed light
on more future studies.
I. INTRODUCTION
We are experiencing a booming development of
deep learning technologies. Nowadays, more and more
systems employ deep learning models, such as self-
driving cars [5] and face recognition systems [25].
Karpathy even proposes the concept of Software 2.0 [3]
referring to the software written in neural network
weights. If we treat deep learning as a new paradigm of
programming, it actually suffers many software security
and reliability issues. For example, DeepXplore [26]
studies software testing approaches for deep learn-
ing models, because there are already several attacks
(e.g., [23], [24]) showing the effectiveness in fooling
them. Another study [29] shows that attackers can
steal machine learning models via prediction APIs.
Therefore, the security of deep learning techniques
becomes an urgent issue when being deployed in real-
world systems.
In this paper, we consider a particular security
threat to deep learning, model piracy. Programming a
superior deep learning model is expensive. It requires
much domain expertise to design an effective deep
learning network and a large set of labeled data to
train the network, both of which are valuable resources.
Because well-trained models are expensive, competitors
or attackers may get interested in pirating them. An
intuitive way is to copy the architecture of a network,
which dominates the learning ability of a model.
Besides, attackers may fine-tune a model for their
own application scenarios. There are already many
investigations focusing on building new deep learning
applications based on existing ones, such as those with
transfer learning [10] and incremental learning [31]
techniques. If a deep learning model runs on the client
side, which is a trend (e.g., smartphone [17], [20], [30]),
attackers can easily reverse engineer the model and
further pirate the design. Therefore, model piracy is a
pressing security concern for deep learning application
providers.
To secure a deep learning model against piracy
attack, we propose to obfuscate the structures of well-
trained deep learning models before releasing them to
clients. Our idea is similar to classic code obfuscation
techniques except that we tailor the idea for deep
learning scenarios. Code obfuscation transforms code
snippets into unintelligible versions while preserving
their semantics [7]. Deep learning obfuscation, on the
other hand, aims to scramble the structure of a well-
designed deep learning network while preserving the
inference accuracy. In this way, users can still employ
an obfuscated model for inference, but attackers cannot
learn useful structural information from the model. To
our best knowledge, this paper serves as a first attempt
to study the deep learning obfuscation problem.
Our study focuses on a prevalent type of deep learn-
ing networks, convolutional neural networks (CNN).
Many companies start to engage CNN in their sys-
tems for image recognition tasks, e.g., in mobile
apps or auto-driving systems. To achieve a good
recognition accuracy, state-of-the-art CNNs generally
contain well-designed inception blocks for feature
extraction and a fully-connected layer for classification.
For example, GoogLeNet [28] employes four parallel
convolutional sequences in one inception block with
different settings to learn different features; ResNet [14]
employs a special convolutional branch to learning
residual information. For modern CNNs, their key
difference generally lies in the design of the feature
extractor, while the classifiers of different CNNs are
very similar. Therefore, hiding the real structure of
a feature extraction network is a major concern for
obfuscation.
We propose to obfuscate the feature extractor
of a CNN model by simulating it with a shallow
and sequential convolutional block. Consequently, the
simulation network leaks little structural information
about the original feature extractor. Meanwhile, the
obfuscated model should also be resilient to fine-
tuning attacks because the simulation network bears
poor learning abilities due to a shallow structure. To
simulate a feature extraction network precisely, we
incorporate a novel recursive simulation method and a
joint training method to training the simulation network.
The recursive simulation method simulates a feature
extractor in a recursive mode. In the first round, we
simulate each inception block of a feature extractor with
a simulation network. In the second round, we simulate
the entire simulated feature extractor achieved in the
first round. During each iteration of simulation, we
employ the joint training method to train a simulation
network, i.e., we employ both the intermediate output of
the original network and the labels of the training data
as the ground truth. Finally, we can obtain an obfuscated
model with no loss of accuracy.
To verify the feasibility of our idea, we have
conducted several real-world experiments with popular
CNNs, including GoogLeNet [28], ResNet-18 [14] and
DenseNet-121 [18]. Although their feature extraction
networks are very deep with tens or even hundreds of
layers, we can simulate them with a shallow network of
five or seven layers. We show that the obfuscated models
suffer no loss of accuracy. On the other hand, they are
even more efficient than the original models in both
model size and inference time. We further show that
the obfuscated models demonstrate promising resilience
to fine-tuning attacks. Attackers would suffer obvious
accuracy declination if they fine-tune the obfuscated
models to create new applications.
To summarize, we make several contributions as
follows.
• We formulate the deep learning obfuscation
problem with respect to model piracy. In
particular, we observe the potential structure
piracy and parameter piracy threats to deep
learning models and propose five metrics to
evaluate a deep learning obfuscation solution,
namely cost, information leakage, fine-tuning
ability, resilience to deobfuscation attacks, and
scalability.
• We propose a novel solution to obfuscate CNN
models with recursive simulation and joint
training. Our approach can simulate the feature
extractor of a CNN model with a shallow con-
volutional block, which conceals the structural
information of the original network and also
deters attackers from fine-tuning an obfuscated
model.
• We have verified the feasibility of our approach
with several real-world experiments. Our re-
sulting obfuscated models suffer no loss of
accuracy, and they are even more efficient than
the original models in both model size and
inference time.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows.
Section II briefly reviews the background of CNN.
Section III defines our attack model for model piracy
attack. Section IV discusses the deep learning obfus-
cation problem. Section V introduces our structural
obfuscation approach, and the evaluation is provided in
Section VI. Section VII compares our paper with related
work, and Section VIII finally concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARY
This section briefly reviews the techniques of CNN,
which is a preliminary for the deep learning obfuscation
approach we propose in this work.
A. CNN Basis
CNN is a special type of deep neural networks
that contains convolutional layers and fully-connected
layers. The convolutional layers serve as a feature
extractor of the network, which inputs images and
outputs features. The fully-connected layers serve as a
classifier, which classifies images based on the extracted
features.
Figure 1 demonstrates a simple CNN with one
convolutional layer and one fully-connected layer. We
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Fig. 1. A toy example of convolutional neural networks with one
convolutional layer and one fully-connected layer.
discuss the detailed function of either layer in what
follows. We use uppercase letters to denote matrices and
lowercase letters to denote the elements of a matrix. For
example, K is a matrix, and ki,j is an element of the
matrix.
The convolutional layer reads raw images X ∈
R
h×w×m with size h × w and m channels (e.g., red,
green, and blue for colorful images), and outputs n
feature images (i.e., n channels). Each output channel
corresponding to a convolutional kernel Ki and a bias
βi ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is calculated as follows.
F(Ki, X) =
m∑
j=1
f(Ki, Xj) + βi, (1)
where Ki is a matrix whose elements are the weights
of corresponding pixels on an image X , and
f(Ki, Xj) =
h∑
p=1
w∑
q=1
kp,q · xp,q. (2)
The fully-connected layer connects each pixel of
each feature image to all the class labels. A label
with the highest value is voted as the final decision.
The formula for computing the value of each label is
demonstrated in below.
G(X1, ...Xn) =
n∑
i=1
h×w∑
j=1
xi,jwi,j + βi,j . (3)
B. Modern CNNs
While conventional CNNs (e.g., LeNet [21]) only
contain different layers organized in sequential orders,
the architectures of modern CNNs are more complex.
They generally include well-designed inception blocks
to facilitate the learning ability. An inception block
is a sub-network with convolutional layers and other
nonlinear layers, such as batch normalization [19] and
ReLU (Rectified Linear Units). These layers are similar
to building blocks, and a programmer can organize them
in many ways.
Figure 2 demonstrates the inception blocks of
several popular CNNs, including GoogLeNet, ResNet,
and DenseNet. The inception block of GoogLeNet
(Figure 2(a)) contains four parallel sequences, each of
which has a unique convolutional function to learn
particular features. All the convolutional sequences
output feature tensors of the same size, and the
inception block finally concatenates them as its output.
ResNet (Figure 2(b)) contains two parallel sequences
in an inception block. The sequence with a smaller
convolutional kernel is designed to propagate the
residual information. The design is essential when a
neural network goes deeper. The inception block finally
adds up the tensors outputted by the two convolutional
sequences. DenseNet (Figure 2(c)) further improves
the mechanism for propagating residual information. In
each dense block, the output of every two convolutional
layers is propagated to the following layers of the block.
A well-designed feature extractor is a key for
a CNN to improve its performance when handling
particular tasks, such as the ImageNet Large Scale
Visual Recognition Challenge (ILSVRC) [8]. Note that
all our discussed modern CNNs have only one fully-
connected layer, and they mainly differ in the feature
extraction network. Therefore, hiding the structure of
the feature extraction network is the most important
concern when obfuscating deep learning models.
III. ATTACK MODEL
This work considers the man-at-the-end (MATE)
attack [6]. Supposing a well-trained deep learning model
has been installed on a client host (e.g., PC server
or smartphone) for inference, the MATE attack model
assumes that attackers can have full access to the
host. If attackers have adequate domain knowledge
and determination, they may reverse engineer the
application, and then they may pirate the design of the
model.
Figure 3 demonstrates our attack scenario. We
assume that a company (i.e., model owner) has released
an application to its users, and the application contains a
deep learning model. We further assume that the model
contains a novel design of network structure, and it
is trained with a large corpus of valuable data. The
assumption is very general for real-world deep learning
applications because such data are either the private
assets of a company or require many manual efforts
to get labeled. In the MATE attacker model, attackers
(e.g., competitors) may reverse engineer the application
and pirate the deep learning model. Such infringement
of copyrights would cause loss to the model owner.
In this work, we consider two types of piracy behav-
iors: structure piracy and parameter piracy. In structure
piracy, attackers reverse engineer an application and
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Fig. 2. Examples of inception blocks.
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Fig. 3. Our assumed attack scenario.
extract the model structure, and then they can employ
the structure to design their own networks. For CNN
models, the distinctive design of structures lies in their
feature extractors. Therefore, an effective obfuscation
solution should hide such structural information in the
obfuscated model. Parameter piracy means attackers
can employ the well-tuned model states (or parameters)
to create new models, e.g., with incremental learn-
ing [31] and transfer learning [11] techniques.
Incremental learning extends the number of classes
that a deep learning network can support [31]. Attackers
may leverage the technique to empower a model.
Figure 4(a) demonstrates the effectiveness of a simple
incremental learning approach. In this experiment, the
original model is trained with the CIFAR-10 dataset,
and it supports 10 classes. Our incremental learning
program empowers the model to support a new dataset
(i.e., CIFAR-100) with 100 classes. We change the last
fully-connected layer of the CNN to support 100 classes,
and then train the model with the target dataset. Finally,
the model can achieve an accuracy of 67.95% after 200
epochs. In comparison, if we train the same CNN from
scratch, the best accuracy is only 58.49% with the same
training settings.
Transfer learning adapts the domain differences
between a target dataset and what a model supports [11].
It is an effective machine learning approach when
there are insufficient training data in a target dataset.
Attackers may employ the technique to pirate a new
model and adapt it to their own scenarios. Figure 4(b)
demonstrates the effectiveness of a transfer learning
experiment. In this experiment, the original model is
trained with the CIFAR-10 dataset. The target dataset
is STL10 [4], which contains only 500 labeled images
for each class. If we train the model directly with the
target dataset [14]), we only achieve an accuracy of
58.67%. However, if we adopt a straightforward transfer
learning technique (i.e., ResNet-TLFT in Figure 4(b)),
the accuracy can improve to 77.94%.
In the two examples above, we both fine-tune the
original feature extractors to achieve a good accuracy.
Note that fine-tuning can usually help attackers to
obtain a better model than without fine-tuning. For
example, in our transfer learning example in Figure 4(b),
if we freeze the feature extraction layers and only
tune the fully-connected layer (i.e., ResNet-TLFF in
Figure 4(b)), the model accuracy can only achieve
72.91%.
IV. DEEP LEARNING OBFUSCATION
A. Definition
Now we discuss the concept of deep learning
obfuscation. It aims to transform the inference logic
of a well-trained deep learning model to an obfuscated
version, which can prevent attackers from learning its
structural design or reusing its well-tuned parameters.
The obfuscated model should retain an equivalent
inference function as the original model contains.
Meanwhile, it should incur very limited overhead and
demonstrate adequate resilience to attackers.
We borrow the term “obfuscation” from classic
code obfuscation problems because their purposes are
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(a) GoogLeNet (a tailored version with 1024 features) incremental
learning with the CIFAR-100 dataset. INC: incremental learning.
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(b) ResNet transfer learning with the STL10 dataset. TLFF: transfer
learning with frozen feature, TLFT: transfer learning with fine-
tuning [2].
Fig. 4. Examples that demonstrate the value of parameter piracy attacks via fine-tuning. In our examples, the initial ResNet and GoogLeNet
models are trained with the CIFAR-10 dataset.
similar. According to Collberg et al. [7], classic code
obfuscation scrambles code spinets into unintelligible
versions while preserving the semantics. It can increase
the difficulties for attackers to interpret the real code
logic or to further tamper the code.
However, deep learning obfuscation is a bit different
from classic software obfuscation. In particular, the
parameters of deep learning models are automatically
generated via a training process. To tamper a model,
attackers do not need to understand the model, and he
can simply fine-tune it with new data. In comparison,
classic software is written by programmers. Attackers
cannot modify it without understanding the details.
B. Performance Metrics
A competent deep learning obfuscation approach
should demonstrate good performance in the following
aspects.
• Cost: Cost measures the extra model size
and inference time incurred by obfuscation. A
practical obfuscation approach should not incur
too much overhead. Otherwise, it would be
useless for real-world applications.
• Information leakage: It shows how much struc-
tural information is leaked by the obfuscated
model. The metric corresponds to structure
piracy issues. A potent obfuscation approach
should leak as little information as possible.
• Fine-tuning ability: It measures the how much
learning ability declination that an obfuscated
model suffers. We can measure the metric
by comparing the performance of an original
model and an obfuscated model when per-
forming the same fine-tuning task. It reflects
the resilience of an obfuscated model to the
parameter piracy attacks. A network with poor
fine-tuning ability can deter attackers from fine-
tuning the model parameters with new training
data.
• Resilience: The metric reflects the resistance of
an obfuscated model to deobfuscation attacks.
In our scenario, deobfuscation means recov-
ering the original structure of the network or
empowering an obfuscated model with better
fine-tuning ability.
• Scalability: It indicates whether an obfuscation
approach can be applied to different deep
learning models. In this work, we claim the
effectiveness of our obfuscation approach for
convolutional neural network only.
Note that resilience evaluates the security of an ob-
fuscation approach, while information leakage and fine-
tuning ability evaluate its effectiveness (or potency).
Next, we introduce our structural obfuscation approach
for protecting CNN models and then evaluate the
performance of our obfuscation approach with respect
to these metrics.
V. STRUCTURAL OBFUSCATION APPROACH
For state-of-the-art CNN models, the essential
valuable design lies in the structure of their feature
extractors. Our structural obfuscation approach, there-
fore, aims to hide the structures of the feature extraction
networks via simulation. Below, we first introduce our
basic idea of model simulation and then demonstrate
how to employ the idea to obfuscate CNN models.
A. Basic Idea
In high level, our obfuscation idea simulates the
feature extractor of a CNN model with a shallow
and sequential network. In this way, the simulation
network does not reveal the internal structure of the
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Fig. 5. Our joint training approach to simulate the feature extractor
of a CNN model.
original feature extractor. Also, by employing a shallow
network as the simulator, we intend to lower the fine-
tuning ability of the obfuscated model with respect to
parameter piracy attacks.
To obtain a competent simulation network, we
propose a novel joint training idea, which employs
two different ground truths to train the simulation
network jointly. Our first ground truth is the output
of the target feature extractor, which is the output
of a hidden layer. A CNN model generally outputs
more features in a hidden layer than the number of
classes in the output layer. In this way, employing
the intermediate output to train a simulation network
can provide more fine-grained information than pure
labels, and it will facilitate the learning process. The
idea is also known as hint-based training [27]. In hint-
based training, there is a teacher network and a student
network, and the student network learns the intermediate
knowledge generated by the hidden layers of the teacher
network. However, employing a pure hint-based training
approach is insufficient for our scenario because the
original hint-based training approach is proposed for
model compression scenarios. It compresses a teacher
network into a student network which is deep and thin.
Our approach, on the other hand, aims to simulate a
teacher network with a shallow network. Because a
shallow network tends to have worse learning ability,
it may not learn the teacher network as well as a deep
network. If there are simulation errors, we hope to
mitigate the influence of the error with the information
of the real label. Therefore, we also employ the label
of raw input as our second ground truth for training.
Figure 5 demonstrates our joint training idea.
Let T denote the original feature extractor of a
teacher network, S denotes the simulator of a student
network, S ′ denotes a mixed network that connects the
simulator with the rest layers of the original network,
and Lx denotes the real labels of the input data x.
We employ the following objective function to train the
simulator.
argmin
w
‖T (x)− Sw(x) + α(Lx − S
′
w(x))‖ , (4)
where ‖ · ‖ represents the L1-norm, and w represents
the parameters of the simulator.
Because the simulation network is shallow, we may
not train it as well as the original model. In this
situation, the real labels can serve as an error corrector
or a regulator. By choosing an appropriate value for α,
we can balance the resulting impacts to the learning
process.
In our later evaluation section, we adopt a tricky
approach to search optimal solutions for the joint
optimization problem. We assume the two types of
losses are comparable with an appropriate α, then we
can employ the two ground truths iteratively to train the
simulator.
B. Obfuscation Framework
Because real-world CNNs are very complex, we
may not be able to simulate a feature extractor directly.
To achieve an acceptable simulation result, we propose
to simulate a feature extractor recursively. To elaborate,
we first simulate each inception block of an extractor
with a small simulator. Then we fine-tune the resulting
model to achieve a good accuracy. In the next round,
we simulate the new feature extractor which contains
several small simulation networks.
The first round of simulation obtains two benefits.
On one hand, we can lower the complexity of the
target feature extractor to simulate. On the other hand,
it examines whether a target model can be simulated
with a shallow network. If we cannot simulate a
feature extractor with a deep network of several small
simulators, we are unlikely to be able to simulate it with
one shallower network. After this round, we usually get
an intermediate model with an equivalent or slightly
higher accuracy.
Our obfuscation framework is demonstrated in
Figure 6. We insert an obfuscation phase after the
training phase and before the model is released to
clients. The obfuscation phase contains two rounds. In
the first round, we obfuscate each inception block of
the model iteratively. The obfuscation starts from the
bottom layer and goes up to the top layer. In this order,
the residual errors of the lower layers can be mitigated
when obfuscating the upper layers. There are several
steps in each iteration.
1) Define a simulation network: We first create
a small simulation network with a shallow
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Fig. 6. Our framework to obfuscate CNN models.
and sequential structure. Then we plug the
network into the original computation graph
of the model and make its input and output
the same as those of the original inception
block. We defer our discussion about design-
ing the structure of a simulation network to
Section V-C.
2) Train the network: We tune the parameters of
the simulation network with the joint training
idea. The training data is the same as those
for training the original model. To preserve
the weights of other layers, we freeze all the
parameters before and after the simulator.
3) Merge the model: We delete the original
inception block from the original network
and merge the corresponding parameters. This
step outputs an intermediate obfuscated model.
The obfuscation procedure goes to the next
iteration until all the inception blocks have
been obfuscated.
When all the inception blocks have been simulated,
we fine-tune the model to achieve better accuracy. Now
we can obtain a model M ′ (intermediate result) with
only sequential connections, which is the input to the
next simulation round. In the next round, we also
employ the joint training approach to simulate the entire
feature extractor of M ′ at a time.
Note that the hint-based training approach requires
that the teacher network and the student network should
have the same dimension of output. So our intermediate
resultM ′ still leaks the information about the interfaces
(e.g., feature numbers) between neighboring inception
blocks. Our second round of simulation can further hide
such information. In this way, the finally obfuscated
model leaks little information about the internal struc-
ture of a feature extractor.
C. Design of Simulation Networks
We should design the simulation networks carefully
because they determine the performance of an obfus-
cated model. If the structure of a simulation network is
too simple, it may not be able to simulate well. If it is
too complicated, the obfuscated model would incur too
much overhead.
When designing a simulation network, our main
principle is to maintain the corresponding input and
output relationships of the original inception block.
For example, if a feature of output corresponds to a
5×5 image of input in the original network, we should
guarantee that the simulation network also computes
the feature based on the 5 × 5 image. To fulfill the
principle, we should choose an appropriate combination
of convolutional layers and kernel sizes. Below we
elaborate more on the principle.
1) Warm Up: We first discuss an ideal scenario
which assumes no nonlinear operators in an inception
block. In this case, we can simulate the inception block
precisely with only one convolutional layer. We draw
this conjecture based on Rule V.1 and Rule V.2.
Rule V.1. For any two-layered sequential convolutional
block with no nonlinear operators, there exists an
equivalent convolutional layer to simulate it.
Proof: To show that we can simulate any two-
layered convolutional layers with only one layer, we
show that the feature images outputted by a two-layered
convolutional layers are linear to the input.
Supposing the first convolutional layer inputs images
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X of cin channels and outputs feature images Y of cl1
channels, we can compute a pixel value y of Y as
y =
cin∑
i=1
f(K,Xi) + β, (5)
whereK is a kernel matrix,Xi is a corresponding image
of the ith channel, and f(K,Xi) = k1,1x1,1+k1,2x1,2+
...+ khl1,wl1xhl1,wl1 , where hl1×wl1 is the kernel size
of the first convolutional layer.
Because K and β are constants in a pre-trained
model and only Xi contains variables, we can simplify
Equation 5 as
y = α1x1,1,1 + ...+ αcl1,hl1,wl1xcl1,hl1,wl1 , (6)
where αi is a constant, and y is linear to X .
Similarly, supposing the second convolutional layer
outputs feature images Z of cl2 channels, we can
compute a pixel value z of Z with the form of z =
α1y1,1,1 + ... + αcl2,hl2,wl2ycl1,hl1,wl1 . Unfolding each
y, we can get
z = λ1x1,1,1 + ...+ λqxcin,h,w, (7)
where λi is a constant, h = hl1+(hl2−1)s, w = wl1+
(wl2 − 1)s, and s is the stride of the first convolutional
layer.
Rule V.2. For any two-paralleled convolutional layers
merged with concatenation or add, there exists an
equivalent convolutional layer to simulate it.
Proof:
Suppose the input images are X with cin channels,
the first convolutional layer outputs features Y of c1
channels, and the second convolutional layer outputs
features Z of c2 channels. A pixel value y of Y can
be computed as
y =
cin∑
i=1
f(Ky, Xi) + β, (8)
and a pixel value z of Z can be computed as
z =
cin∑
i=1
f(Kz, Xi) + β, (9)
where Ky is a kernel of the first convolutional layer,
and Kz is a kernel of the second convolutional layer.
If the layers are merged with concatenation, we
can directly substitute the block with an equivalent
convolutional layer with a channel size c1 + c2 and a
kernel size Max(Size(Ky), Size(Kz)). If the layers
are merged with add, the two convolutional layers
should have an equivalent number of channels, c1 and
c2.
Given any inception block without nonlinear oper-
ators, we can apply Rule V.1 and Rule V.2 iteratively
to compress the module into one convolutional layer.
The channel number of the resulting convolutional layer
should be equivalent to the original inception block. Its
kernel size should be selected as the max kernel size
when simulating each convolutional sequence.
2) Choose an Appropriate Structure: When an
inception block has nonlinear operators, we cannot sim-
ulate the module precisely. However, we can still apply
Rule V.1 and Rule V.2 to compute an appropriate kernel
size. Take the inception block of ResNet (Figure 2(b))
as an example, we can compute that each feature
corresponds to a 5×5 image, so that we can simulate the
block with one convolutional layer whose kernel size is
5, or with two convolutional layers whose kernel sizes
are both 3. If an inception block has pooling operations
(e.g., the inception block of GoogLeNet (Figure 2(a))),
we treat them as same as convolution, because they are
also kernel-based operations.
In general, we can design a simulation network with
two to four convolutional layers to simulate an inception
block. By default, we apply both batch normalization
and ReLU after each convolutional layer. The specific
choice generally depends on the complexity of the
inception block to simulate. For example, to simulate
one inception block of GoogleNet, two convolutional
layers are sufficient. However, if the target block
has tens of convolutional layers, we may employ a
simulation network with more convolutional layers. We
will discuss more details about how we design the
simulation network for several practical deep learning
models in the evaluation section (Section VI).
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we examine the performance of
our obfuscation approach with real-world experiments.
We focus on three aspects: 1) whether an obfuscated
model can achieve negligible accuracy declination in
comparison with the original model; 2) how much
overhead will be incurred by our obfuscation approach;
3) and whether the fine-tuning abilities of obfuscated
models become worse.
A. Experimental Setting
To show that our obfuscation approach has no
bias on particular CNN structures, we choose three
prevalent CNNs to obfuscate, i.e., GoogLeNet [28],
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(b) Obfuscating ResNet.
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(c) Obfuscating DenseNet.
Fig. 7. The structures of CNN models and their simulation networks employed in our experiments. CN: channels.
ResNet [14] and DenseNet [18]. Figure 7 demonstrates
the architecture of the networks we adopted in our
experiments, and we train them with the CIFAR-10
dataset. To fit the CNN structures for the dataset, we
have slightly changed their original settings.
The CIFAR-10 dataset [1] contains 10 classes of
32 × 32 colorful images (e.g., airplane, automobile,
bird). Each class contains 5000 images for training
and 1000 images for testing. The dataset is widely
employed to benchmark the performance of CNNs, such
as ResNet [14] and DenseNet [18]. We train the CNN
models using the suggested settings of learning rates
until the testing accuracy cannot get further improved.
In our experiment, it takes one thousand epochs each
to train a model. Our GoogLeNet model finally reaches
an accuracy of 90.83%, ResNet reaches 90.94%, and
DenseNet reaches 90.14%. The detailed training results
are demonstrated in Figure 8(a), Figure 8(e), and
Figure 8(i) respectively.
To conduct obfuscation experiments, we write all
of our deep learning programs with Pytorch 3.1 and
experimental scripts with Python 3.6. Our experimental
host is an Ubuntu (version 16.04) server with a
Xeon CPU (E5-2650) and 128G memory, and the
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experimental GPU is Nvidia Titan Xp Pascal with 12G
memory.
B. Steps of Obfuscation
1) Simulating GoogLeNet: Figure 7(a) demonstrates
our obfuscation steps for GoogLeNet. The original
GoogLeNet has nine inception blocks, each of which
is demonstrated as Figure 2(a). These nine inception
blocks are separated into three groups by max pooling
operations: {2A, 2B}, {3A, ..., 3E}, and {4A, 4B}.
We finally obfuscate GoogLeNet with a five-layered
sequential block. To this end, we adopt the recursive
simulation idea. In the first simulation round, we sim-
ulate each group of inception blocks with a sequential
block. For the groups of {2A, 2B} and {4A, 4B}, we
employ a two-layered convolutional block each. For
the group of {3A, ..., 3E}, we employ a four-layered
convolutional block, and for {4A, 4B} with a three-
layered convolutional block. Then we fine-tune the
resulting model to obtain an intermediate result. Note
that when simulating each group of inception blocks,
we freeze all the parameters of other layers. When
fine-tuning the model, we tune all the parameters of
the intermediate model. Then in the second simulation
round, we employ the fine-tuned intermediate model
to train a six-layered convolutional block, which is the
feature extractor of our final obfuscated GoogLeNet.
2) Simulating ResNet: Figure 7(b) demonstrates our
process to obfuscate ResNet. We employ ResNet-18,
which contains four inception blocks, and each block
has two sub-blocks. In the first round, we simulate each
inception block of the network at one time with a two-
layered convolutional block. In the second round, we
simulate the whole feature extractor of the intermediate
model with a five-layered convolutional block.
3) Simulating DenseNet: Figure 7(c) shows how we
obfuscate DenseNet-121. It has four dense blocks, and
each block has 12, 24, 48, or 32 convolutional layers
respectively. Their connection mode is demonstrated as
Figure 2(c). In the first round, we simulate each dense
block at one time. The four simulation networks have
3,4,2,2 convolutional layers respectively. In the second
round, we simulate the whole feature extractor at one
time with a five-layered convolutional block.
C. Performance of Obfuscated Models
Table I demonstrates our experimental results when
obfuscating the three models. For each obfuscation
experiment, we report the performance of the original
model, the intermediate model achieved after the first
round of simulation, and the finally obfuscated model.
For each of the models, we measure its performance
with testing accuracy, model size, and average inference
TABLE I. EVALUATION RESULTS ABOUT THE PERFORMANCE
OF OUR OBFUSCATED MODELS. FOR EACH MODEL, WE REPORT
THE ACCURACY, MODEL SIZE, AND AVERAGE INFERENCE TIME.
THE OVERHEAD IS COMPUTED AS
cost2
cost1
− 1.
Model
Sim.
Round
Performance Overhead
acc.
size
(MB)
time
(µs)
size time
GoogLe
-Net
- 90.83% 2.51 17.85 - -
1st 90.99% 7.82 7.69 212% -59%
2nd 90.92% 2.49 7.01 -1% -63%
ResNet
- 90.94% 43.36 10.50 - -
1st 91.39% 26.80 6.76 -38% -36%
2nd 91.04% 11.38 5.17 -74% -51%
Dense
-Net
- 90.14% 4.24 35.53 - -
1st 90.87% 8.86 8.86 109% -75%
2nd 90.31% 4.21 5.52 -1% -84%
time. From the results, we can observe that all our
finally obfuscated models suffer no accuracy declina-
tion, and some are even more efficient than the original
models.
For ResNet, our finally obfuscated model saves
74% size of the original model, and it is about two
times faster than the original model. This is not very
surprising, because ResNet is not very efficient in model
size. Note that the inception block of ResNet adds up
the results of two parallel convolutional sequences as
its output. Therefore, it needs more parameters than
a sequential network to compute the same number of
features.
The results show that we can also obfuscate
GoogLeNet and DenseNet with no size overhead, and
the obfuscated models can save 63% and 84% average
inference time correspondingly. This is not easy
because the two networks are already very efficient
in model size. Their inception blocks concatenate
the resulting feature images of parallel convolutional
sequences. In this way, they need fewer parameters than
a sequential network to compute the same number of
features. Although our intermediate results achieved in
the first round incur extra size overhead, such overhead
can be fully mitigated after the second round.
Figure 8 demonstrates more detailed records about
each round of our obfuscation experiments. From the
figures, we can observe that after the first simulation
round, the resulting model generally suffers some
accuracy declination. However, we can fine-tune the
intermediate model (with the data labels as the ground
truth) to achieve better accuracy. This is not because
the architecture of the intermediate model is more
powerful, but because it employs a good initial state
for fine-tuning. Note that we can hardly improve the
accuracy of the original models before. The interesting
phenomenon provides some benefits for our second
round of simulation. The recursive simulation, therefore,
can help us to approach a more competent obfuscation
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TABLE II. EVALUATION RESULTS WHICH COMPARE THE
FINE-TUNING ABILITY OF AN OBFUSCATED MODEL AND THE
ORIGINAL MODEL. FOR EACH EXPERIMENT,WE REPORT THE
ACCURACY AND THE DECLINATION OF ACCURACY. THE
DECLINATION IS COMPUTED AS 1−
accuracy2
accuracy1
.
Network
CIFAR-100 STL10
accuracy decline accuracy decline
GoogLeNet 66.5% - 79.15% -
Obf. GoogLeNet 63.59% 4.4% 77.95% 1.5%
ResNet 66.92% - 78.86% -
Obf. ResNet 64.77% 3.2% 75.97% 3.7%
DenseNet 67.16% - 78.45% -
Obf. DenseNet 62.91% 6.3% 76.90% 2.0%
result with better accuracy. In some cases, if we could
not obtain an intermediate model with slightly better or
at least equivalent accuracy, it implies the simulation
network may not be powerful enough, and we should
empower the simulation network, such as by adjusting
the number of convolutional layers or channels.
D. Fine-tuning Ability
To evaluate the fine-tuning ability of each obfuscated
model, we conduct an incremental learning experiment
with the CIFAR-100 dataset [1], and a transfer learning
experiment with the STL10 dataset [4]. The CIFAR-
100 dataset has 100 classes of images, and each class
contains 500 images for training and 100 images for
testing. The STL10 dataset has 10 classes of images,
which is the same as CIFAR-10. However, the original
image format of STL10 is 96 × 96, and we have to
resize the images to 32× 32 to fit our model. Besides,
there are also only 500 images for training in each class.
Because the training dataset of CIFAR-100 and STL10
are both 10 times smaller than CIFAR-10 for each class,
we may not achieve an accuracy as good as CIFAR-10.
Employing transfer learning and incremental learning
techniques should be helpful to achieve better accuracy.
Table II demonstrates our experimental results.
As a comparison, we also report the corresponding
performance of the original model. Overall, the obfus-
cated models suffer obvious accuracy declination when
performing both the incremental learning and transfer
learning tasks, ranging from 1.5% to 6.3%. Our detailed
experimental records are demonstrated in Figure 9. To
compare the performance fair, we employ the same
training strategy for each model and its obfuscated
model. The experimental results verify our idea that an
obfuscated model with shallow structure should have
worse fine-tuning ability than its original model.
In particular, the declination degrees are related to
specific fine-tuning tasks and the structures of simula-
tion networks. In our experiment, the declinations of
the incremental learning experiments are more obvious
than those of the transfer learning experiments. We think
one reason is that the incremental learning task is more
difficult than transfer learning task because it requires
distinguishing 10× classes. The fine-tuning ability
declination may further exaggerate when pursuing more
difficult tasks. Therefore, the metric of fine-tuning
ability is related to particular tasks, and such results only
provide developers a relative measurement about the
resilience of obfuscated models to fine-tuning attacks.
In practice, one may try several different simulation
networks and choose one with the best performance and
the worst fine-tuning ability as the final solution.
E. Discussion
Besides the cost and fine-tuning ability which we
have already evaluated, a competent obfuscation ap-
proach should also perform well concerning information
leakage, resilience, and scalability. Below, we discuss
the performance of our obfuscation approach in these
aspects.
1) Information Leakage: Our obfuscation approach
conceals the internal structures of the feature extraction
network. We simulate the entire feature extractor of a
CNN model with a simulation network. In this way,
the obfuscated model exposes no information about the
original feature extraction network expect the interfaces
of input and output, including the raw image size
and the number of extracted features. Besides, the
fully-connected layer also leaks the number of classes
supported. However, when attackers want to pirate a
deep learning model, such information is not very
critical. The most important information lies in the
design of the feature extraction network, which has
already been protected by our approach.
2) Resilience to Deobfuscation: We discuss the
resilience of our approach in two aspects. Firstly, can
attackers recover the structure of an original network?
The answer is no. Attackers cannot figure out the
original structure of a feature extractor, because such
information is not retained within the obfuscated model.
Secondly, can attackers empower an obfuscated
model with respect to learning? One possible way might
be employing another powerful network to simulate the
obfuscated model. However, there are two barriers for
attackers to launch such attacks. One barrier is that
attackers should know a powerful network, and another
barrier is that they should have high-quality data to train
the simulation network. Note that in our attacker model,
we assume the original training data are unavailable
to attackers. Without the training data, attackers can
only tune the new kernel parameters with other artificial
datasets (e.g., some randomly generated images).
3) Scalability: Currently, we have only evaluated the
feasibility of our approach for several CNN models.
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Fig. 8. Our detailed experimental results when obfuscating the models of GoogLeNet, ResNet, and DenseNet. For each model obfuscation
experiment, we show the accuracy when training the original model, conducting the first round of simulation, performing fine-tuning, and
conducting the second round of simulation.
Therefore, we claim the effectiveness of our solution for
CNN models only. However, we may extend the idea to
other types of neural networks, such as recurrent neural
networks. This is a direction of our future work.
For CNN models, the performance of our obfus-
cation approach could be related to the complexity of
a target model, such as the depth of the network to
simulate and the knowledge it contains. In this paper,
we have verified that our approach can effectively
obfuscate a well-trained DenseNet-121 model, which
is already very deep with more than a hundred
layers. Therefore, our simulation-based approach is very
promising to obfuscate different convolutional neural
networks. Besides, several recent processes (e.g., [13],
[12]) achieved in model compression area also adopt
simulation-based ideas, and their results also coincide
the scalability of our approach.
However, our approach may not be able to obfuscate
a model efficiently if it is already very efficient. For
example, we can hardly obfuscate a compressed model
with no cost, because such models memorize knowledge
efficiently with only a small number of parameters.
In that case, we may apply obfuscation techniques on
an uncompressed model first and then compress the
obfuscated model.
VII. RELATED WORK
Now we discuss existing papers related to our
work. Our work studies model piracy threats and
the deep learning obfuscation problem. To our best
knowledge, it is a pilot study in this area. There are
other investigations which also focus on the security
issues of deep learning models (e.g., [23], [29], [16],
but their attack models and purposes are very different
from ours.
We obfuscate deep learning models via a simulation-
based approach. The similar approaches are also em-
ployed in model compression work (e.g., [22], [15],
[9], [13], [12]). Some investigations compress a well-
trained model without changing its structure, such
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Fig. 9. Our detailed experimental results when comparing the fine-tuning abilities of the obfuscated models and their original models. We
employ the STL10 dataset for transfer learning experiments, and the CIFAR-100 dataset for incremental learning experiments.
as network pruning [22], [13], and quantization [12].
Network pruning compresses well-trained CNN models
by prune the less important connections and weights.
A quantization-based approach employs fewer bits for
each parameter of the model. They all show that
the compressed models after fine-tuning suffer no
declination of accuracy.
There also other compression approaches which
intend to compress the structure of the network. They
try to distill the knowledge learned by the large
and cumbersome network, and install the knowledge
into another small model [15]. FitNets [27] is a
representative work in this area. To compress a model,
FitNets simulates a deep learning model with another
network that is deeper and thinner. Our work, on the
other hand, attempts to simulate a model with a shallow
network. This is because the purpose of our paper is
different from model compression. As a result, we may
have different priorities when designing the simulation
networks. Specifically, we purposely hide the structure
of a model and degrade its fine-tuning ability. Therefore,
employing a deeper simulation network is not our prior
choice, because a deep network is likely to have good
learning abilities. On the other hand, model compression
aims to compress a model with high efficiency, while
security is not a concern. FitNets proposes a hint-based
training approach to train the simulation networks. Our
joint training approach also incorporates the idea, while
it is an enhancement of joint-based training.
In brief, model compression is a technique or-
thogonal to ours. Although our approach and existing
model compression investigations share some common
technical background concerning network simulation,
they are different in both purposes and detailed designs.
We may further employ model compression techniques
to compress an obfuscated model in our future work.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have discussed the piracy threats
to deep learning models, and we propose to obfuscate
such models before releasing them to clients. To our best
knowledge, this paper is a first attempt to investigate
the deep learning obfuscation problem. In particular, we
have discussed the concept of deep learning obfuscation
and the performance metrics for evaluating a competent
obfuscation solution. Moreover, we propose a structural
obfuscation approach for obfuscating CNN models. Our
obfuscation approach simulates the feature extractor of a
CNN model with a shallow and sequential convolutional
block. We train the simulation network incorporating
a novel joint training method and a recursive training
method. We have verified the effectiveness of our
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approach with three prevalent CNNs, and the results
show that we can obfuscate their structures with no
declination of accuracy. Furthermore, the obfuscated
models can be even more efficient than their original
models. As a security benefit, our obfuscated model
leaks no critical information about internal structure
of the original CNN network. In the meanwhile, by
choosing a shallow simulation network with a poor fine-
tuning ability, the obfuscated model can be resilient to
parameter piracy attacks.
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